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Summary
In the wrong hands, hazardous materials (hazmat) in transportation pose a major
threat to national security, property, and life.  There are over 800,000 shipments each
day of these materials–over 90% of which occur via the highway mode. The sheer
number and volume of shipments, the numerous routes used, and the logistics and
infrastructure involved create many points of exposure.  Although an array of   measures
can be taken to promote security, the vulnerabilities cannot be eliminated.  The
Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken numerous actions to increase the
sensitivity of industry and the state enforcement community to the vulnerabilities
associated with hazmat transportation.  DOT is asking that additional safety precautions
and inspections be conducted and that the hazmat industry should review its security
measures and strengthen them as appropriate.  Other options to reduce risk or to increase
preparedness include:  requiring additional background checks on drivers obtaining
hazmat endorsements on their commercial drivers licenses; requiring DOT to issue
regulations requiring high hazard hazmat carriers and shippers to develop and implement
security plans and procedures; increasing funding for the Hazardous Materials
Emergency Preparedness Grant Program; and amending the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act to clarify the role of the DOT in promoting the security of hazmat
shipments. 
Increasing attention is focused on various means that could be used by terrorists to
attack the United States.  In the wrong hands, hazmats in transportation pose a major
threat to national security, property, and life.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation has
issued warnings about the potential misuse of trucks transporting hazmats by terrorists.
According to DOT, it doesn’t take a high degree of technical expertise, training, or
sophisticated equipment to use hazmats to attack with devastating consequences.1  This
report considers:  What is the scope and nature of the vulnerability of hazardous materials
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(hazmats) transportation to terrorists attacks?  What is the Department of Transportation
(DOT) doing to reduce these risks?  What other options might be pursued to increase the
security of these shipments?  
Vulnerabilities and Risks
There are over 800,000 shipments each day of hazmats, including gasoline, fertilizers,
liquefied petroleum and natural gases, poisonous materials, radioactive substances,
corrosives, infectious substances, and other toxics.2  Over 90% of these shipments occur
via the highway mode.  Within the transportation system, there are many points of
vulnerability, including drivers, vehicles, loading and unloading plants, tank farms,
chemical plants, ports, bridges, tunnels, and hundreds of thousands of miles of rail and
pipeline.  The sheer number and volume of shipments, the numerous routes used, and the
logistics and infrastructure involved create virtually unlimited exposure.  In addition,
different commodities, and combinations of chemicals, pose a wide array of potential
safety and exposure risks, if these materials were released during transportation.  Even the
federally-mandated  hazards communication system, including its placards on the sides of
trucks, shipping papers carried by the drivers, and markings on packages, increases the
vulnerability of shipments to attack.  This system, which is designed to provide information
to assist emergency responders regarding the nature of the materials being transported,
also could signal an informed terrorist that a specific truck or railcar could be transporting
a hazmat.  
Although numerous measures can be taken to promote security, the vulnerabilities
are simply too many to totally eliminate risks, notwithstanding the huge costs that would
be required.  Depending on the materials and the amounts released, the proximity to
buildings and people, and other factors, the consequences from a terrorist attack could
range from being relatively minor to catastrophic.  On the other hand, hazmats are
essential components of our modern society. These materials serve such diverse purposes
as fuel, medical diagnostic agents, and agricultural aids.
Selected DOT Actions 
DOT, including the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) (which
issues most of the hazmat regulations), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA)(which focuses on highway carriers and shippers of hazmat), and the Federal
Railroad Administration (which focuses on railroad carriers and shippers of hazmat),  has
taken numerous actions to increase the sensitivity of industry and the state enforcement
community to the vulnerabilities associated with hazmat transportation.  DOT is asking
that additional safety precautions be taken and that the hazmat industry should review its
security measures and strengthen them as appropriate. To reduce risks, DOT is providing
some security-focused information to the industry and is requesting shippers and
transporters of certain hazmats to consider using routes that would avoid populated areas
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be alert to and report any suspicious activities that they may see.  DOT does not want
hazmat vehicles to be left unattended and is asking that companies ensure that hazmats are
in responsible and reliable hands.3  
FMCSA is in the process of visiting most of the nation’s hazmat highway carriers to:
increase their  level of awareness to terrorist threats, offer specific recommendations to
improve security, and remind them of relevant regulatory requirements. That agency is
generally recommending to hazmat carriers that they implement a security plan that
includes efforts to:  review driver lists, paying particular attention to drivers “... whose
names can be linked to one of the countries that have  been identified that support terrorist
activities” and conduct  “...more detailed background checks for suspicious individuals”;
ensure that the safety-oriented background checks have been performed on individuals as
required by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; improve hazmat package and
control systems; strengthen en-route security mechanisms; improve communication
systems; and assess and, if necessary, increase security around facilities involved in the
transportation of hazardous materials.4  The task of visiting thousands of hazmat carriers
primarily to address security concerns is indeed formidable and will reduce the ability of
the agency to focus, in the near-term, on carriers that have been selected for audits because
of safety concerns.  In addition, concerns about profiling certain drivers may be raised.
Also, FMCSA has requested the states to significantly increase their roadside inspections
of drivers transporting hazmat, paying particular attention to check the commercial
licenses of those drivers who have received their hazmat endorsement during the last two
years.5  Other DOT activities, including some Coast Guard efforts, intended to promote
security are discussed at: http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter151.html. 
Additional Options to Reduce Risk or to Improve Preparedness
and Responses to Hazmat Releases 
Despite the measures that have been taken, the transportation system, including
vehicles and infrastructure, continues to provide numerous potential “soft” targets.6   It is,
therefore,  not surprising that other options are under discussion to increase security
regarding hazmat shipments or to increase response capabilities should unexpected releases
occur.  Some of those options include:
 
1. Requiring criminal and security-related background checks on drivers
obtaining hazmat endorsements on their commercial drivers licenses; 
2. Requiring DOT to issue regulations requiring high hazard hazmat carriers and
shippers to develop and implement security plans and procedures;
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4. Revising the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended, to clarify the
role of the Secretary of Transportation regarding the security of hazmat
shipments. 
Improved Background and Security Checks on Hazmat Drivers.  The
current background check conducted on commercial drivers pertains primarily to the
employment and safety record of the prospective driver.  As now specified in 49 CFR
391.23, a criminal record check is not required by FMCSA.  (It should be noted that the
Federal Aviation Administration regulations specify a detailed criminal history record
check of a broad range of airline and certain airport employees or contractor employees
to promote security, see 14 CFR 108.33.)  
Several groups, including some enforcement officials and motor carriers, want
increased background checks of drivers, especially operators of hazmat trucks.  For
example, the American Trucking Associations, Inc., seeks authorization from Congress
to allow motor carriers access to national crime information data bases in order to conduct
criminal background checks of employees and potential employees.7  If a motor carrier
were required to conduct a more extensive background check, including a criminal history
or security-related record check, the workload on the state and federal law enforcement
community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may  need to be considered.
According to FMCSA, almost 2.5 million commercial drivers have an endorsement on
their license that allows them to transport hazmat.8  Alternatively, state licensing agencies
could be required to conduct such a check before granting a hazmat endorsement on a
driver’s license or before renewing such a license.  Again workload considerations would
be raised.  In either case, there would also be the issue of specifying the standards that
would need to be met before a driver would be disqualified from transporting hazmat.
Should any felony conviction disqualify someone from driving?  Should a driver be
automatically disqualified from driving hazmat vehicles if that driver is not a U.S. citizen
and originates from a country thought to support terrorists?9  Another issue is:  Should
security and other background checks be conducted on those seeking training to drive
hazmat vehicles?   
Require  DOT to Issue Regulations Requiring High Hazard Hazmat
Shippers and Carriers to Develop and Implement Security Plans and
Procedures.   Except for regulatory requirements, the response to DOT’s warnings,
consultations, and suggestions regarding transportation security that were previously
discussed are essentially voluntary in nature.  DOT does not specifically require each
hazmat carrier or shipper dealing with high hazard materials to develop a security plan and
to follow the procedures and recommendations that are sought during the consultations
previously referenced.  The costs to industry of a regulation requiring their implementation
of new security provisions and the expected impact on reducing terrorist attacks may need
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to be considered.  The vulnerability of hazmat carriers, however, to hijacking and other
attacks by terrorists could pose serious risks of a potentially catastrophic nature, with even
greater costs to the carrier and society at large.
Increased Funding for the Hazardous Materials Emergency
Preparedness Grant Program.  Given the numerous safety and security risks inherent
in the transportation of hazmats, there is substantial interest in reviewing the
RSPA-administered Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness Grants Program, which
provides funds to state and local governments to help these entities  plan and train for
responding to hazmat spills, seeks to improve the overall quality of hazmat response
training, and offers technical assistance in these areas.  For FY2002, DOT is requesting
the authority to award $5.0 million for planning grants and $7.8 million for training grants,
plus other expenses.  In the House and Senate version of H.R. 2299, the FY2002 annual
DOT appropriations act, an obligation limitation on expenses associated with this program
and related expenses has been set at $14.3 million for FY2002.  When the grant funds are
allocated among all of the participating states, the amount of each grant for most states
ranges between $100,000 and $300,000 per year, with five states receiving grants of
around $500,000 to $970,000 per year.   RSPA states that each year the program helps
train 120,000 to 130,000 responders. The results of a survey reported by RSPA indicates
that 3.2 million emergency responders need training.10 
The activities conducted under this program serve many public purposes and affect
several modes of transportation.  In particular, many of the same police and emergency
medical responders who receive training under this program would also be called upon to
respond to pipeline spills, a railroad derailment, or terrorist attacks on other transportation
infrastructures. 
As Congress considers the  reauthorization of federal hazardous materials law, 49
U.S.C 5101 et. seq., or as new security and preparedness measures are evaluated in light
of the events of September 11, 2001, it might be worthwhile to consider the funding base
for this program, whether additional funds are needed, and the source of such funds.
Many in industry, which now finances this grant program, would be  reluctant to bear the
sole burden of paying for increased grants.  This raises the issue: What other source of
funds is available?  Another relevant policy issue is: Should the reserve (about $15 million)
that has been built up to fund this program be obligated?  If so, when?  
  
Amending the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA).  In
addition to clarifying the federal/state regulatory role in hazmat transportation safety, the
HMTA, as amended, is primarily focused on promoting the safety, but not necessarily the
security, of hazmat shipments. In general, the more than 1000 pages of the Federal
Hazardous Materials Transportation Regulations, which were issued to implement the
HMTA, and subsequent amendments to that act, were designed primarily to promote
safety during transportation, not to ensure security and reduce risks from possible
terrorists attacks.  Parking, attendance of the vehicle (observational requirements), and
routing regulations are illustrative exceptions that have both safety and some security
implications.  
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Given the recent tragic events, the issue has been raised as to whether the Secretary’s
role in promoting the security of hazmat shipments should be detailed in statute, perhaps
with congressional guidance regarding the relative balance or priority of safety versus
security tradeoffs.  In particular, Congress could authorize or direct the DOT Secretary
to become much more proactively involved in reducing security risks.  Several approaches
might be considered, including additional requirements for security-focused training for
various transportation personnel dealing with hazmat;  improved measures to protect all
transportation assets (including physical security systems associated with the vehicle or
railcar) as well as security-sensitive information; ensuring that increased attention is paid
to aspects of hazmat regulation with definite security implications; mandatory security
plans pertaining to all components of the hazmat system (from the shipper, transporter,
to the receivor/conseignee); increased use of technology to monitor and track shipments,
communicate with operators, and promote cargo securement; development of “best
practices” information packages to assist industry, and applied research to develop
improved security-oriented strategies and to underpin these approaches. 
Increased attention to security concerns would require a fundamental change in the
DOT’s regulatory regimen and enforcement posture, which has historically focused on
reducing the likelihood of “accidental” releases of hazmats.  A program with both strong
safety and comprehensive security dimensions might begin to more effectively address
hijackings and other forms of terrorism that can be used against hazmat transportation.
Such a program also could begin to accommodate the interests of those who are willing
to work within the regulatory system, and begin to address risks posed by those who seek
to avoid regulatory involvement.  This option, however, raises questions regarding:  the
costs of new requirements that might be issued as a result of increased DOT involvement
in security concerns, the effectiveness of such measures on reducing the frequency and
severity of terrorist actions, and whether a new administrative structure is needed within
DOT to implement new security responsibilities stemming from a change in the HMTA,
as amended, or other transportation safety statutes.    
